None of this is to defend the idea that some of the assertions are actually true, as realistic. But this indicates that moral realists can recognize a necessary link between moral demands and action without renouncing cognitivism, which is central to their position. Perhaps surprising, but also a little intuitive when you think about it, highly educated or intelligent people tend to be much more ideological than the general public. Rather, they are partisan, obsessed with moral and political cause, or use an intellectual framework or idealized model to interpret the world. In any event, even if the nature of the differences gives a certain plausibility to cognitivism, moral realists must also respond to the the theorist`s assertion of error that arguments and disagreements are all based on a false assumption that there are indeed facts as they should be real for some of these assertions to be true. And, as morally realists respond, they must avoid this in a way that makes a mystery of the generalized moral differences (or at least of difference) that everyone recognizes. Quick correction: s/abstract rational`s argumenting/abstract moral reasoning/ It is interesting to note that the two lines of argument are not really compatible. If one thinks that moral assertions do not even purport to report facts, one cannot understandably state that the facts purporting to report such allegations do not exist. Nevertheless, the reflections that each mobilizes could be widely used to support the other. For example, someone who defends a theory of error could indicate how moral requirements are used to express people`s emotions, attitudes and interests, or to serve them, to explain why people continue to argue as they do when there are no moral facts. And someone who defends non-congolism could indicate the practical usefulness of discourse, as if there were moral facts to explain why moral pretensions claim to report facts when they do not. No no. When Anjali acknowledges her moral obligation to submit to her parents` wishes, she considers it one of the many special duties she imposes on her parents, who sit next to other special duties towards other members of her extended family, all named katarvya.
If I deny having a moral obligation to submit to the wishes of my parents, I do not think of Katarvya, and in fact, before meeting Anjali, I had no idea of Katarvya. I thought about the kind of commitments recognized in liberal individualism; I did not violate my parents` rights when I designed my life plan according to my own desires and not according to their own. Anjali and I never really contradicted what we owe our parents. She had confirmed that she owed her parents Katarvya`s special duties, while I had denied that my parents` rights also meant dictating my most important life choices. Some moral realists respond to this reasoning by rejecting the idea that convictions are all motivating inerts (Platts 1979). According to them, moral convictions are a counter-example. But this is not the only apparent counter-example. Think, for example, of the first person`s claims about the perspective of pain.